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Abstract
This paper theoretically investigates how trade aects skill intensity at rm level.
In order to analyze this, we develop a model in which rms engages in the division of
labor within rms by in putting two types of labor. Unskilled labor is inputted into
the production line of the production division and skilled labor is inputted into the
production division to conduct the production line. Firms can reduce marginal cost
by promoting the division of labor in the production division. Both types of labor
are also inputted into head oce for domestic market and for export market. These
head oces are dierent in skill intensity. Though all rms are ex-ante identical, the
division of labor of exporters is stronger than that of non-exporters on the unique
equilibrium. That xed labor input of headquarter division for export market is more
skill intensive than that for domestic market is equivalent to the fact that total labor
input of exporters is more skilled intensive than that of non-exporters. Furthermore,
all rms reduce the type of labor inputted intensively into head quarter division for
the export market while raising the type of labor inputted less intensively into that
division.
Keywords: export decision; division of labor within rms; skill intensity
JEL classication numbers : F12
1 Introduction
Traditional studies of international trade have investigated the following questions. Which
industries are relatively skill intensive? How does trade liberalization enhance certain
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industries' skill intensity? By contrast, some recent studies emphasize the changes in skill
intensity at rm level. For example, Bustos (2011) indicates that the changes in relative
demand for skilled labor cannot be explained by labor reallocation across industries and
rms but by skill upgrading within rms. Using microdata from Sweden, Davidson et al.
(2013) indicate that exporters have more skill-intensive organizations than nonexporters,
and furthermore, multinational enterprises have more skill-intensive organizations than
exporters.
Then, how should rms decide to export and reorganize their structure ? We partic-
ularly focus on the division of labor in this regard. This paper presents a simple model
that theoretically investigates the relationship between export decisions and decisions on
the extent of the division of labor within rms. We incorporate two types of labor and two
types of xed costs composed of the two types of labor into the model of Chaney and Ossa
(2013). Following Medein (2003), xed costs for the domestic and export markets dier in
skill intensity.
This paper's main results are as follows. To guarantee a unique equilibrium in which
exporters and nonexporters coexist, skill intensity of the two types of xed costs need to
be dierent. The division of labor of exporters is stronger than that of nonexporters. That
the xed labor input of head oces for the export market is more skill-intensive than that
for the domestic market is equivalent to the total labor input of exporters being more skill-
intensive than that of nonexporters. Regardless of decreases in variable and xed trade
costs, or the structures of head oces, the number of exporters increases while the numbers
of nonexporters and all rms decrease. Furthermore, all rms reduce the type of labor
inputted intensively into head quarter division for the export market while raising the type
of labor inputted less intensively into that division. These results are robust in this model.
Whether the inequalities in labor input, output, and skill intensity between exporters and
nonexporters expand depends critically on whether trade liberalization aects a rm's
marginal revenue directly.
In this model, if skill intensity of the two types of xed costs is the same, there is little
possibility of an equilibrium in which exporters and nonexporters coexist. This property
is shared with Medin (2003) and Yeaple (2005). In those models, there are only ex-ante
identical rms. We show that such models need the two types of xed costs in skill intensity
to guarantee equilibrium in which exporters and nonexporters coexist. Yeaple (2005) shows
exporters adopt more high technology based on more skilled-intensive rm structure than
nonexporters. This result is consistent with this paper's model to a certain degree although
this paper's model depends on dierences in skill intensities of the two types of xed costs.
This paper's research is related to trade and rm structure, in particular, skill inten-
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sity. Zadeh (2013) focuses on the extent of the division of labor of each type of labor
independently and shows a relationship between relative specialization and trade. Holmes
and Mitchell (2008) consider the relationship between trade and mechanization. Davidson
et al. (2013) present a model in which rms input only skilled workers into head oces
for the export market. Yeaple (2005) considers the relationship between trade and skill
formation. Ekholm and Midelfart (2005), Bustos (2011), and Harrigan and Reshef (2011)
consider trade-induced skill-biased technological change. All these studies show that trade
raises the skill intensity of exporters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes aurtarkic equilibrium.
Section 3 analyzes how opening up to trade promotes the division of labor and increases
welfare. Section 4 analyzes how trade liberalization promotes the division of labor. Finally,
we present the Conclusion and Appendix.
2 Autarkic economy
We introduce the division of labor into the trade model of monopolistic competition with
xed export costs. The setup of the model is based on Chaney and Ossa (2013). In this
section, we develop a model of an autarkic economy.
2.1 Representative household
There are L units of unskilled workers and K units of skilled workers. They supply one
unit of labor inelastically at wage rates w and v, respectively. The preference of the
representative households is given by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function
over a continuum of goods indexed by , as follows U =
R
2 c()
d
1=
; 0 <  < 1,
where the measure of the set  represents the mass of available dierentiated goods, and
c() represents the consumption of variety . Since all workers belong to the representative
household, its budget constraint is given by
R
2 p()c()d  wL+ vK +M, where  is
rm prot and M is the number of rms. From standard utility maximization, the price
index can be obtained as follows P =
R
2 (p())
1  d
1=(1 )
, where  = 1=(1   ) > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and also represents the price
elasticity of demand for each variety.
2.2 Firm structure
Firms input labor into a production division and head oce. Firms input lup units and
lud of unskilled labor into the production division and head oce, respectively. Similarly,
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rms input lsp units and l
s
d of skilled labor into the production division and head oce,
respectively. The total labor input of unskilled and skilled labor is given by lut  lup + lud
and lst  lsp + lsd, respectively.
Firms can operate by inputting a combination of unskilled and skilled labor into the
head oce, regardless of output. We let fd be the combination and fd is dened as fd =
(lsd=)
 [lud=(1  )]1 , where  2 (0; 1). Firms minimize the cost of head oces, FCd,
dened as FCd = vl
s
d + wl
u
d . Hence, rms face the following minimization problem under
given (w; v)
min
lsd;l
u
d
FCd = vl
s
d + wl
u
d ; s:t: fd = (l
s
d=)
 [lud=(1  )]1  :
The solution to this problem is given as follows
lsd(w; v) =
fd
(w=v)1 
;
and
lud(w; v) =
(1  )fd
(v=w)
:
These equations give
FCd(w; v) = w
1 vfd:
That is, rms must pay FCd(w; v) as xed costs.
The structure of rms' production divisions is similar to that of Shintaku (2015). Un-
skilled labor is inputted into production lines. Skilled labor coordinates teams in production
divisions.
From the result of Shintaku (2015), unskilled labor, which is inputted into a product
line for y units of a nal good, is given by lup (t; y) = (y)=(2t). Skilled labor, inputted as
coordinators, is given by lsp(t; y) = tf .
Firms select the number of teams t such that variable cost V C(t; y; w; v) is minimized
for given (y; w; v), where V C(t; y; w; v) = vlsp(t; y) + wl
u
p (t; y). From @V C(y; w; v)=@t =
vf   wy=(2t2), we can obtain the optimal number of teams, as follows t(y; w; v) =
[(w=v)(y)=(2f)]1=2.
By substituting t(y; w; v) for lsp(t; y) and l
u
p (t; y), we can obtain the following equations
lsp(y; w; v) =

w
v
fy
2
1=2
;
and
lup (y; w; v) =

v
w
fy
2
1=2
;
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respectively. lsp(y; w; v), l
u
p (y; w; v), and V C(t; y; w; v) give V C(y; w; v) = (2wvfy)
1=2.
V C(y; w; v) and FCd(w; v) give the following total cost function
TC(y; w; v)  V C(y; w; v) + FCd(w; v) = (2wvfy)1=2 + w1 vfd:
From TC(y; w; v), the marginal cost function, MC(y; w; v), is given by MC(y; w; v) =
(1=2) (2vwf=y)1=2. From TC(y; w; v), the average cost function, AC(y; w; v), is given by
AC(y; w; v) = (2wvf=y)1=2 + w1 vfd=y. Note that @MC=@y < 0 and @AC=@y < 0
hold.
From V C(t; y; w; v), we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. As the division of labor is promoted (t increases), the real marginal cost
measured by unskilled labor (MC(y; w; v)=w) decreases, given wages of unskilled and skilled
labor.
Proof : See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 indicates that we can use the number of teams to represent rm produc-
tivity.
2.3 Autarkic equilibrium
Autarkic equilibrium is characterized by the optimal pricing rule, PP : p = MC(y; w; v),
where   =( 1) and the free-entry and free-exit condition, FE : p = AC(y; w; v), under
given (w; v) are as follows
PPAjv=w :
p
w
=

2

v
w
2f
y
1=2
; (1)
FEAjv=w :
p
w
=

v
w
2f
y
1=2
+
 v
w
 fd
y
: (2)
Subscript Ajv=w represents the conditions at autarkic equilibrium under given (w; v).
For our later analysis, we introduce notations B and Gd.
Denition 1. We dene B and G as follows
B  
2
  1;
Gd  v
w

fd:
5
PPAjv=w of (1) and FEAjv=w of (2) give yAjv=w = (w=v)G2d=(2fB
2) and (p=w)Ajv=w =
(v=w)[B(B + 1)f ]=Gd, respectively. By substituting yAjv=w for t(y; w; v), ls(y; w; v), and
lu(y; w; v), we can obtain tAjv=w = (w=v)[Gd=(2fB)] and the following equations
lst;Ajv=w =
w
v
Gd

 +
1
2B

;
lut;Ajv=w = Gd

1   + 1
2B

:
The market-clearing conditions of unskilled and skilled labor are given by L = Mlut;Ajv=w
and K = Mlst;Ajv=w, respectively. These equations formulate simultaneous equations, in
which M and (v=w) are unknown variables. We can solve these equations by using the
abovementioned lst;Ajv=w and l
u
t;Ajv=w as follows
 v
w

A
=
L
K
 
 + 1
2B
 
1   + 1
2B

;
MA =
1
fd

K
 + 1=(2B)

L
1   + 1=(2B)
1 
:
Then, we have characterized all endogenous variables.1)
We impose the following assumption to obtain the internal solution.
Assumption 1. B > 0 holds. That is, 2 <  and 1 <  < 2 hold.
Assumption 1 is a necessary and sucient condition for the existence of the internal
solution.
Proposition 2. If and only if Assumption 1 holds, endogenous variables MA, (v=w)A, yA,
(p=w)A, tA, l
s
t;A, and l
u
t;A are positive.
Proof. To guarantee that (v=w)A and MA are positive, we do not always need B > 0.
However, if yA, (p=w)A, tA, l
s
t;A, and l
u
t;A are positive, we need B > 0. Hence, if all
endogenous variables are positive, we need B > 0. Conversely, if B > 0, all endogenous
variables are positive. Q.E.D.
3 Opening up to trade
We extend the model reported in the previous section to the case of trade between two
identical countries with xed export costs. Without the loss of generality, we focus on the
1) From Walras' law, we have not analyzed an income{expenditure clearing condition.
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home country's allocation.
3.1 Firms' decisions
Firms choose among the following options: to exit or enter the domestic market (nonex-
porters), or to exit or enter both the domestic and foreign markets (exporters). Hereafter,
we use superscript \ne", which is the nonexporter variable, and \e", which is the exporter
variable.
Exporters experience two types of trade costs. First, they must export  2 [1;1) units
of product to send one unit to a foreign market (iceberg trade cost). Second, to enter export
markets, exporters must input a combination of unskilled labor (lux) and skilled labor (l
s
x)
into their head oces, regardless of output. We let fx be the combination and fx is dened
as fx = (l
s
x=)
 [lux=(1  )]1 , where  2 (0; 1). Firms minimize the cost of their head
oces, FCx, where FCx is dened as FCx = vl
s
x + wl
u
x.
In a similar manner to derivation of lsd(w; v) and l
u
d(w; v), we can obtain l
s
x(w; v) and
lux(w; v) as follows
lsx(w; v) =
fx
(w=v)(1 )
;
lux(w; v) =
(1  )fx
(v=w)
;
where  2 (0; 1). Hence, exporters must pay the following xed costs in addition to FCd
FCx(w; v) = w
1 vfx:
Then, we can obtain the total cost function of exporters as follows
TCe(yet ; w; v) = (2wvfyt)
1=2 + w1 vfd + w1 vfx;
where yet represents the total output of exporters. Exporters sell to consumers in domestic
and foreign countries by using yet units of output. To produce y
e
t units of output, exporters
input le;ut units of unskilled labor and l
e;s
t units of skilled labor. l
e;u
t and l
e;s
t are dened as
le;ut = l
e;u
p + l
e;u
d + l
e;u
x and l
e;s
t = l
e;s
p + l
e;s
d + l
e;s
x , respectively
The nal good market-clearing conditions for nonexporters and exporters of the home
country are given by cne = y
ne and yet = y
e
d+y
e
x = ce+c
0
e, respectively, where c
0
e represents
the consumption by foreign consumers of imported brands from the home country. The
superscript * represents the economic entities of the foreign country and the superscript 0
represents imported brands.
Price index PT (dual to the aggregator C), which representative households face, is
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given by PT =
R
2 (pd())
1  d +
R
2 [pd(
)]1  d
1=(1 )
, where nonexporters and
exporters of the home country set a price for consumers in the home country of pned and
ped, respectively. Exporters in the home country set a mill price of p
e
d for consumers in
the foreign country. Hence, the optimal pricing rules of nonexporters and exporters are
given by pned = MC(y
ne; w; v) and ped = MC(y
e; w; v), respectively. The free-entry and
free-exit conditions of nonexporters and exporters are given by pned = AC(y
ne; w; v) and
ped = AC(y
e; w; v), respectively.
3.2 Trading equilibrium
Nonexporters face the same type of optimal pricing rule and free-entry and free-exit con-
ditions as PPAjv=w of (1) and FEAjv=w of (2). Hence, yneT jv=w, (pd=w)
ne
T jv=w, t
ne
T jv=w, l
ne;s
t;T jv=w,
and lne;ut;T jv=w are the same values as those of yAjv=w, (p=w)Ajv=w, tAjv=w, l
s
t;Ajv=w, and l
u
t;Ajv=w,
respectively.
On the other hand, exporters face a dierent type of free-entry and free-exit condi-
tion from FEAjv=w of (2) while they face the same type of optimal pricing rule as PPAjv=w
of (1). We can obtain the free-entry and free-exit condition that exporters face by re-
placing (v=w)(fd=y) with (v=w)
(fd=y) + (v=w)
(fx=y) in FEAjv=w of (2). Hence, we
can obtain yeT jv=w, (pd=w)
e
T jv=w, t
e
T jv=w, l
e;s
t;T jv=w, and l
e;u
t;T jv=w by replacing (v=w)
(fd=y) with
(v=w)(fd=y)+(v=w)
(fx=y) in yAjv=w, (p=w)Ajv=w, tAjv=w, lst;Ajv=w, and l
u
t;Ajv=w, respectively.
For our later analysis, we introduces notation Gx.
Denition 2.
Gx 
 v
w

fx
By using Gx, the free-entry and free-exit condition that exporters face can be rewritten
as follows
FEeT :
pd
w
e
T jv=w
=

v
w
2f
yet
1=2
+
Gd +Gx
yet
: (3)
Hence, we can obtain yeT jv=w, (pd=w)
e
T jv=w, t
e
T jv=w, l
e;s
t;T jv=w, and l
e;u
t;T jv=w by replacing Gd with
Gd+Gx in yAjv=w, (p=w)Ajv=w, tAjv=w, lst;Ajv=w, and l
u
t;Ajv=w, respectively, as follows: y
e
t;T jv=w =
(w=v)(Gd+Gx)
2=(2fB2),

ped
w

T jv=w
= (v=w)[B(B+1)f ]=(Gd+Gx), t
e
T jv=w = (w=v)(Gd+
Gx)=(2fB), l
s
t;T jv=w = (w=v)(Gd +Gx)[+ 1=(2B)], and l
u
t;T jv=w = (w=v)(Gd +Gx)[1  +
1=(2B)].
For all (v=w) > 0, yet;T > y
ne
T , (p
e
d=w)T < (p
ne
d =w)T , t
e
T > t
ne
T , l
e;s
t;T > l
ne;s
t;T , and l
e;u
t;T > l
ne;u
t;T
hold.
yet;T > y
ne
T and (p
e
d=w)T < (p
ne
d =w)T are explained in Figure 1.
yet;T > y
ne
T implies t
e
T > t
ne
T . Hence, we can obtain the following proposition.
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Figure 1: Tarding equilibrium in (y; p=w) space.
Proposition 3. For any (v=w) > 0, the division of labor of exporters is stronger than that
of nonexporters.
From Proposition 1, teT > t
ne
T implies MC
e
T < MC
ne
T . Hence, productivity of exporters
is higher than that of nonexporters. This result is similar to Yeaple (2005) and Bustos
(2011) in the sense that exporters have more skill-intensive structures and adopt higher
technology than nonexporters. This is because exporters must obtain more revenue than
nonexporters in order to pay xed export costs, FCx, in addition to FCd. This implies
that the average productivity of this industry at trading equilibrium is higher than that at
autarkic equilibrium.
In order to make lut;T jv=w and l
s
t;T jv=w simple, we introduce the following notations.
Denition 3.
R1   + 1
2B
; R2 = 1   + 1
2B
Q1  + 1
2B
; Q2 = 1  + 1
2B
Using R1, R2, Q1, and Q2, we can rewrite l
u
t;T jv=w and l
s
t;T jv=w as follows
le;st;T jv=w =
w
v
(GdR1 +GxQ1) ;
le;ut;T jv=w = GdR2 +GxQ2:
For the relationship among R1, R2, Q1, and Q2, we can obtain the following properties.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the following conditions hold.
1. Q1=Q2  R1=R2 is equivalent to   .
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2. Q1=Q2 < R1=R2 is equivalent to  < .
Proof
Q1=Q2  R1=R2 is equivalent to (   )(1 + 1=B)  0. (   )(1 + 1=B)  0 is
equivalent to    under B > 0. Q1=Q2 < R1=R2 is equivalent to (  )(1 + 1=B) < 0.
(  )(1 + 1=B) < 0 is equivalent to  <  under B > 0. Q.E.D.
By using Lemma 1, we can obtain the following properties for the relationship between
skill intensity of headquarter division for the domestic market, , and that for the export
market, .
Proposition 4. For any v=w > 0, the following conditions hold under Assumption 1.
1. That the labor input of fx is more skilled labor-intensive than that of fd is equiv-
alent to the total labor input of exporters being more skilled labor-intensive than that of
nonexporters. That is,  >  is equivalent to (le;st;T jv=w > l
e;u
t;T jv=w) > (l
ne;s
t;T jv=w > l
ne;u
t;T jv=w).
2. That the labor input of fx is more unskilled labor-intensive than that of fd is equiv-
alent to the total labor input of exporters being more unskilled labor-intensive than that of
nonexporters. That is,  <  is equivalent to (le;st;T jv=w > l
e;u
t;T jv=w) < (l
ne;s
t;T jv=w > l
ne;u
t;T jv=w).
Proof. (le;st;T jv=w > l
e;u
t;T jv=w) > (l
ne;s
t;T jv=w > l
ne;u
t;T jv=w) is equivalent to (R1 + Q1)=(R2 + Q2) >
R1=R2. (R1 + Q1)=(R2 + Q2) > R1=R2 is equivalent to Q1=Q2 > R1=R2. Q1=Q2 >
R1=R2 is equivalent to  >  under B > 0 from property 1 of Lemma 1. Similarly,
(le;st;T jv=w > l
e;u
t;T jv=w) < (l
ne;s
t;T jv=w > l
ne;u
t;T jv=w) is equivalent to Q1=Q2 < R1=R2. Q1=Q2 < R1=R2
is equivalent to  <  under B > 0 from property 2 of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
The results of the case  >  are consistent with that of Davidson et al. (2013). In the
model of Davidson et al. (2013), in order to enter the export market, exporters input the
only skilled labor into the headquarter division for the export market. Then, exporters is
more skilled intensive than non-exporters.
These results can be explained as follows. From lup (y; w; v) = [(v=w)(fy)=2]
1=2 and
lsp(y; w; v) = [(w=v)(fy)=2]
1=2, we can obtain lsp(y; w; v)=l
u
p (y; w; v) = w=v. This indi-
cates that for all rms, the skill intensities of the labor input into the production divi-
sion do not depend on rm size measured by output. That is, le;sp (y; w; v)=l
e;u
p (y; w; v) =
lne;sp (y; w; v)=l
ne;u
p (y; w; v) holds. For all rms, the skill intensities of fd are the same.
Therefore, dierences in the skill intensity of total labor input between exporters and
nonexporters arises from that of fx.
Now, we characterize (v=w)T . The relative number of exporters to nonexporters can be
obtained from the nal good market-clearing conditions of the exporters' good, yeT jv=w =
cejv=w + c0

ejv=w, and those of the nonexporters' good, y
ne
T jv=w = cnejv=w. These conditions
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and the optimal pricing conditions give the condition RGMC (See Appendix B for the
derivation), as follows
RGMC :
yet;T jv=w
yneT jv=w
= (1 +  1 )
2
2  : (4)
In addition, optimal pricing conditions, free-entry and free-exit conditions of exporters,
FEeT jv=w, and free-entry and free-exit conditions of nonexporters, FE
ne
T jv=w, give the relative
number of exporters to nonexporters, RFE, as follows
RFE :
yet;T jv=w
yneT jv=w
=

1 +
Gx
Gd
2
: (5)
RGMC and RFE gives the following equation:
1 +  1  =

1 +
Gx
Gd
2 
: (6)
(6) characterizes Gx=Gd. From the denition of Gx=Gd, when Gx=Gd is determined, (v=w)T
is determined simultaneously.
We dene H as H  (1 +  1 )1=(2 ), where H > 1 holds from  > 1 and 1 <  < 2
of Assumption 1. By using H, we can rewrite (6) as follows:
 v
w

T
=

(H   1)fd
fx
1=( )
: (7)
(7) characterizes (v=w)T . When (v=w)T is determined, y
e
t;T , y
ne
T , t
e
T , t
ne
T , l
e;s
t;T , l
ne;s
t;T , l
e;u
t;T , l
ne;u
t;T
(ped=w)T , and (p
ne
d =w)T can be characterized.
To focus on Gx=Gd claries the comparison of the behavior of exporters and nonex-
porters. Figure 2 describes how Gx=Gd is determined and shows the relationship between
the RGMC of (4) and the RFE of (5).
RGMC describes the vertical line in the following result. yet;T jv=w=y
ne
T jv=w depends on
(1 +  1 ) and ped;T jv=w=p
ne
d;T jv=w because y
e
t;T jv=w=y
ne
T jv=w is equal to cejv=w + c
0
ejv=w=cnejv=w.
ped;T jv=w=p
ne
d;T jv=w does not depend on v=w. Therefore, y
e
t;T jv=w=y
ne
T jv=w sticks to (1 + 
1 ).
RFE describes the upward right curve in the following result. As Gx=Gd increase, so
does FCx relative to FCd. Then, exporters must expand rm size and reduce their average
costs to survive. Therefore, as Gx=Gd increases, so does y
e
t;T jv=w=y
ne
T jv=w.
We let z represent the proportion of exporters to all rms. We focus an an internal
solution and let z belong to a set of (0; 1). The labor market-clearing conditions of unskilled
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Figure 2: Relative nal good market-clearing and free-entry and free-exit conditions.
and skilled labor are given by
L = (1  z)Mlne;ut;T + zMle;ut;T ;
and
K = (1  z)Mlne;st;T + zMle;st;T ;
respectively. These equations formulate simultaneous equations, in which z and M are
unknown variables. We can solve these equations as follows
zT =
Gd
Gx
R1  R2 vKwL
Q2
vK
wL
 Q1
; (8)
MT =
1
Gd
KQ2
v
w
  LQ1
Q2R1  Q1R2 : (9)
zT of (8) or MT of (9) may be negative. Furthermore, zT of (8) may be more than 1.
Then, in order to guarantee the existence of the internal solution, we impose the following
assumption. .
Assumption 2. We assume  6=  and the following conditions hold for v=w characterized
by (7).
1. When  >  holds, (R1=R2) < (vK=wL) < (Q1 +R1)=(Q2 +R2) holds.
2. When  <  holds, (R1=R2) > (vK=wL) > (Q1 +R1)=(Q2 +R2) holds.
Then, we can obtain the internal solution as follows.
Proposition 5. If and only if Assumption 1 and 2 hold, an equilibrium that certies an
internal point is determined uniquely.
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Proof: See Appendix C.
These results can be explained as follows. Proposition 5 requires (vK=wL) < (Q1 +
R1)=(Q2 + R2) under  > . This requires that the factor rewards, vK, are suciently
small relative to the factor rewards, wL. That is, it requires that K is suciently small
relative to L, and that  and fx are suciently large relative to fd. Otherwise, all rms
export.
On the other hand, Proposition 5requires that (vK=wL) > (R1=R2) holds for (vK=wL).
That is, this requires that the factor rewards, vK, are suciently large relative to the factor
rewards, wL. Otherwise, all rms enter only the domestic market.
That is, Proposition 5 indicates that under  > , if (vK=wL) is not too large and c
is also suciently small, exporters and nonexporters coexist. We can consider the case of
 <  in a similar manner.
What about the case of  = ? There is little possibility that the internal solution exists
in which exporters and nonexporters coexist; this is because such a solution exists only when
1+  1  = (1+fx=fd)2  holds. Furthermore, even if only 1+  1  = (1+fx=fd)2  holds,
the internal solution is not determined uniquely. In this sense, the assumption of  6=  is
critical. That is, the dierence in skill intensities between exporters and nonexporters is
necessary to guarantee the unique internal solution.
4 Trade Liberalization
We dene trade liberalization as a decrease in variable trade cost,  , or xed trade cost,
fx. We consider the eects of these changes on the division of labor, relative rm size, skill
intensity, relative skill intensity, number of rms, share of the number of exporters, and so
on.
Before such an analysis, we consider the impacts of a decrease in  and fx on (Gx=Gd)T
and (v=w)T .
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, the following properties hold.
1. A decrease in  raises (Gx=Gd)T in both case of  >  and  < .
2. When  >  holds, a decrease in  raises (v=w)T , while when  <  holds, a decrease
in  reduces (v=w)T .
3. A decrease in fx does not change (Gx=Gd)T .
4. When  >  holds, a decrease in fx raises (v=w)T , while when  <  holds, a
decrease in fx reduces (v=w)T
Proof. See Appendix D.
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These properties can be explained as follows.
We consider property 1. This represents an increase in the marginal revenue of exporters
relative to that of nonexporters. Hence, a decrease in  shifts the RGMC line to the right.
If we x (Gx=Gd)T , we can obtain a new point E
0. At this point, exporters have prots
while nonexporters have losses. Hence, some nonexporters enter export markets while some
nonexporters exit these markets. In order to stop this entry and exit, (Gx=Gd)T needs to
rise.
We consider property 2. Although a decrease in  has the same impact on (Gx=Gd)T ,
regardless of  >  and  < , the change in (Gx=Gd)T has dierent impacts on (v=w)T ,
depending on the relationship between  >  and  < . Hence, a decrease in  raises
(Gx=Gd)T in both case of  >  and  < . This means that a decrease in  raises the
relative factor reward of the type of labor inputted intensively in head oces for export
markets. Note that trade liberalization brings skill premiums under  >  while it removes
skill premiums under  < .
We consider properties 3 and 4. A decrease in fx does not change directly the marginal
revenue of exporters relative to that of nonexporters. Then, changes in fx do not aect
(Gx=Gd)T . Since eq (6) keeps (Gx=Gd)T constant, changes in fx aect (v=w)T , depending
on the relationship between  >  and  < , so that a decrease in fx raises the relative
factor reward of the type of labor inputted intensively in the head oces for export markets.
We now consider the eect of a decrease in  on allocations.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1 and 2, we can obtain the following properties.
1. In the case of  > , a decrease in  raises the labor input of unskilled workers and
reduces the number of teams, as well as the labor input of skilled workers, for both exporters
and nonexporters. In the case of  < , a decrease in  reduces the labor input of unskilled
workers and raises the number of teams, as well as the labor input of skilled workers, for
both exporters and nonexporters. In the case of  > 1=2, a decrease in  raises the output
of nonexporters. In the case of (2   1)Gd + (2   1)Gx > 0, a decrease in  raises the
output of exporters.
2. In both cases of  >  and  < , a decrease in  raises the ratio of exporters to
nonexporters in terms of output, number of teams, and labor input for both skilled workers
and unskilled workers.
3. In the case of  > , a decrease in  raises the ratio of exporters to nonexporters in
terms of skill intensity, (le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w)=(l
ne;s
t;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w). In the case of  < , a decrease
in  reduces that ratio.
4. In both cases of  >  and  < , a decrease in  raises the number of exporters
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and reduces the number of nonexporters and all rms.
Proof. See Appendix E.
These properties can be explained as follows.
We consider property 1. Under  > , a decrease in  raises (v=w)T , and hence, raises
the labor input of unskilled workers and reduces the number of teams and the labor input
for skilled workers for both exporters and nonexporters. Under  < , a similar mechanism
works.
We consider property 2. A decrease in  raises Gx=Gd from Lemma 2. This expands
the rm size of exporters relative to that of nonexporters, and hence, raises both ls and lu
relative to nonexporters.
We consider property 3. Under  > , a decrease in  raises (v=w)T . This raise the
ratio of exporters to nonexporters in skill intensity. Under  > , we can undertake a
similar analysis.
We consider property 4 by focusing on labor reallocation. In the case of  > , the
skilled labor input of all rms decreases while the unskilled labor input increases. That
is, new exporters that have skill-intensive head oces for the export market absorb skilled
labor from all other rms, while all the surviving rms absorb unskilled labor from exiting
nonexporters that have unskilled labor-intensive head oces for the domestic market. In
the case of  < , the skilled labor input of all rms increases while the unskilled labor
input increases. That is, new exporters that have unskilled labor-intensive head oces for
the export market absorb unskilled labor from all other rms, while all surviving rms
absorb skilled labor from exiting nonexporters that have skilled labor-intensive head oces
for the domestic market.
We now consider the eect of a decrease in fx on allocations.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1 and 2, we obtain the following properties.
1. The same properties as 1 and 4 of Proposition 6 hold.
2. A decrease in fx=fd does not change relative skill intensity.
Proof
Property 1: In the case of  > , a decrease in fx=fd raises (v=w)T while in the case of
 < , a decrease in fx=fd reduces (v=w)T . These changes are the same as the results of
Property 1 of Lemma 2.
Property 2: A decrease in fx=fd does not change (Gx=Gd)T , as shown in Property 3 of
Lemma 2, and hence, does not change relative skill intensity.
Q.E.D.
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These results indicate that a decrease in fx=fd aects each type of rm's allocation
but does not aect the ratio of both types of labor inputs and skill intensities. This is
because a decrease in fx=fd does not change the marginal revenue of exporters relative to
nonexporters and hence, also does not change (Gx=Gd)T .
We summarize the abovementioned analysis. Propositions 6 and 7 indicate the following
properties. Regardless of a decrease in variable and xed trade cots, or the structure of
head oces, the number of exporters increases while the numbers of nonexporters and
all rms decrease. Furthermore, all rms reduce the type of labor inputted intensively
into head quarter division for the export market while raising the type of labor inputted
less intensively into that division. These results are robust in this model. Whether the
inequalities in labor input, output, and skill intensity between exporters and nonexporters
expand depends critically on whether trade liberalization aects rms' marginal revenue
directly.
5 Conclusion
This paper theoretically investigates the relationship between export decisions and decisions
about the extent of the division of labor within rms. We incorporate two types of labor
and two types of xed costs composed of the two types of labor into the model of Chaney
and Ossa (2013).
All rms are ex-ante identical. To guarantee a unique equilibrium in which exporters
and nonexporters coexist, skill intensity of the two types of xed costs needs to be dierent.
The division of labor of exporters is stronger than that of nonexporters. That the xed labor
input of head oces for the export market is more skill intensive than that for the domestic
market is equivalent to the total labor input of exporters being more skill intensive than
that of nonexporters. The number of exporters increases while the numbers of nonexporters
and all rms decrease. Furthermore, all rms reduce the type of labor inputted intensively
into head quarter division for the export market while raising the type of labor inputted
less intensively into that division. These results are robust in this model. Whether the
inequalities in labor input, output, and skill intensity between exporters and nonexporters
expand depends critically on whether trade liberalization aects rms' marginal revenue
directly.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
V C(t; y)=w can be rearranged as follows:
V C(t; y)
w
= lup (t(y); y) +
v
w
ft(y) =
y
2t(y)
+
v
w
ft(y):
By using this equation, we can obtain the following equations:
MC(t; y)=w =
d[V C(t; y)=w]
dy
=
@[V C(t; y)=w]
@y
+
@[V C(t; y)=w]
@t| {z }
0
dt(y)
dy
=
@[V C(t; y)=w]
@y
=

2t
:
Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Derivation of RGMC (4)
We derives optimal consumptions to derive eq (4). We dene income of representative
households in home country as I, where I = wL + vK. Then, optimal consumptions of
representative households in home country, cnejv=w and cejv=w, are given as follows:
cnejv=w = (pned )
 (PT ) 1I; (B.1)
cejv=w = (ped)
 (PT ) 1I: (B.2)
We can obtain optimal consumption of representative households in foreign country for the
imported brands, c0ejv=w, as follows:
c0ejv=w = c
0
ejv=w by symmetry of countries
= (ped
) (PT ) 1I
= (ped)
 (PT ) 1I: by symmetry of countries (B.3)
Equation (4) can be obtained from theses optimal consumptions, cejv=w, c0

ejv=w, cnejv=w,
nal good market clearing conditions of exporter's good, yeT jv=w = cejv=w + c
0
ejv=w, those
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of non-exporter's good, yneT jv=w = cnejv=w, and optimal pricing, (p
e
d=w)T jv=w, (p
ne
d =w)T jv=w as
follows.
yeT jv=w
yneT jv=w
=
cejv=w + c0

ejv=w
cnejv=w
by nal market conditions
= (1 +  1 )
 
ped;T jv=w
pned;T jv=w
! 
by optimal consumptions
= (1 +  1 )
 
(=2)[(v=w)(2f)=yeT jv=w]
1=2
(=2)[(v=w)(2f)=yneT jv=w]
1=2
! 
by optimal pricing rules
= (1 +  1 )
 
yeT jv=w
yneT jv=w
!=2
:
This gives eq (4).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
Assumption 1 implies H > 0 and H > 0 implies (v=w)T > 0. (v=w)T > 0 implies that
variables of yet;T , y
ne
T , t
e
T , t
ne
T , l
e;s
t;T , l
ne;s
t;T , l
e;u
t;T , l
ne;u
t;T , (p
e
d=w)T , and (p
ne
d =w)T are positive.
We indicates the following conditions under 1 and 2.
 Property 1. zT > 0 implies MT > 0
 Property 2. Under  < ,
0 < zT < 1 $ Q1 +R1
Q2 +R2
<
vK
wL
<
R1
R2
:
 Property 3. Under  > ,
0 < zT < 1 $ R1
R2
<
vK
wL
<
Q1 +R1
Q2 +R2
:
 Property 4. Under  = , an equilibrium which grantees the internal solution exists
only when the following condition holds
1 +  1  =

1 +
fx
fd
2 
:
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Even if the following condition just holds, the internal solution is not uniquely deter-
mined.
Proof of Property 1.
MT > 0 holds when the numerator and the denominator of MT in (9) are positive, or
negative together. Hence, MT > 0 is equivalent to the following condition.
R1
R2
>
Q1
Q2
^ vK
wL
>
Q1
Q2

_

R1
R2
<
Q1
Q2
^ vK
wL
<
Q1
Q2

: (C.1)
zT > 0 holds when the numerator and the denominator of zT in (8) are positive, or negative
together. Hence, zT > 0 is equivalent to the following condition.
vK
wL
<
R1
R2
^ vK
wL
>
Q1
Q2

_

vK
wL
>
R1
R2
^ vK
wL
<
Q1
Q2

:
This condition can be rewritten as follows:
Q1
Q2
<
vK
wL
<
R1
R2

_

R1
R2
<
vK
wL
<
Q1
Q2
:

(C.2)
(C.2) implies (C.1) and hence, zT > 0 implies M > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Property 2.
When the numerator and the denominator of zT in (8) are positive together, zT > 0 is
equivalent to (Q1=Q2) < (vK)=(wL) < (R1=R2) under  <  from property 2 of Lemma
1. Then, z < 1 is equivalent to the following condition:
vK
wL
>
Q1 +R1
Q2 +R2
: (C.3)
We should note that the following condition holds:
Q1 +R1
Q2 +R2
  Q1
Q2
=
Q2R1  Q1R2
Q2(Q2 +R2)
> 0:
This indicates that zT < 1 implies zT > 0. Hence, Property 2 holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Property 3.
When the numerator and the denominator of zT in (8) are negative together, zT > 0 is
equivalent to (Q1=Q2) > (vK)=(wL) > (R1=R2) under  >  from property 1 of Lemma
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1. Then, z < 1 is equivalent to the following condition:
z < 1 $ vK
wL
<
Q1 +R1
Q2 +R2
:
We should note that the following condition holds:
Q1 +R1
Q2 +R2
  Q1
Q2
=
Q2R1  Q1R2
Q2(Q2 +R2)
< 0:
This indicates that zT < 1 implies zT > 0. Hence, Property 3 holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Property 4.
Under  = , R1 = R2 and Q1 = Q2 hold from results of Lemma 1. Then, we may drop
subscripts of R and Q. We can obtain Gx=Gd = fx=fd from the denition of Gd and Gx.
Then, (6) can be rewritten as follows:
1 +  1  =

1 +
fx
fd
2 
: (C.4)
This indicates that if (C.4) does not just hold, there is not the internal solution.
Furthermore, (C.4) does not determine (v=w)T uniquely. This result is dierent form
(6). Therefore, in this case, the equilibrium are determined uniquely. Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 2
Properties 1 and 2
From 1 <  < 2 of Assumption 1 , we can get the following condition:
dH
d
=
1
2   (1 + 
1 )( 1)=(2 ) (1  )| {z }
 
  < 0:
First, we consider a case of  > . Then, we can get the following conditions:
d(v=w)
dH
=
1
  | {z }
+

(H   1)fd
fx
1=( )
fd
fx
> 0;
d(Gx=Gd)
d(v=w)
= (  )| {z }
+
 v
w
( ) 1 fx
fd
> 0:
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From these conditions, we can obtain
d(Gx=Gd)
d
=
d(Gx=Gd)
d(v=w)| {z }
+
d(v=w)
dH| {z }
+
dH
d|{z}
 
< 0:
Next, we consider a case of  < . From the above relations, we can immediately obtain
d(v=w)=dH < 0 and d(Gx=Gd)=d(v=w) < 0. Hence, we can get the following condition:
d(Gx=Gd)
d
=
d(Gx=Gd)
d(v=w)| {z }
 
d(v=w)
dH| {z }
 
dH
d|{z}
 
< 0:
Q.E.D.
Properties 3 and 4
Eq (6) indicates that (Gx=Gd)T does not depend on fx. Hence, properties 3 is proved.
By dierentiating eq (7) for fx, we can obtain
d
 
v
w

T
dfx
=
1
  

(H   1)fd
fx
1=( ) 1
( 1)(H   1)fd
f 2x
:
Hence, under  > , d[(v=w)T ]=dfx < 0 while under  < , d[(v=w)T ]=dfx > 0. Q.E.D.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of Property 1.
From yneT jv=w, we can obtain the following equation:
dyneT jv=w
d(v=w)
= (2  1)
 v
w
2( 1) fd
2fB2
:
This indicates that under  > 1=2, dynet;T jv=w=d(v=w) > 0 while under  1=2, dynet;T jv=w=d(v=w) 
0.
From yeT jv=w, we can obtain the following equation:
dyet;T jv=w
d(v=w)
=
(v=w)2(Gd +Gx)
2fB2
[(2  1)Gd + (2  1)Gx]:
This indicates that under (2  1)Gd + (2  1)Gx > 0, dyet;T jv=w=d(v=w) > 0 while under
(2  1)Gd + (2  1)Gx  0, dyet;T jv=w=d(v=w)  0.
22
By dierentiating tneT jv=w, t
e
T jv=w, l
ne;s
T jv=w, l
e;s
T jv=w, l
ne;u
T jv=w, and l
e;u
T jv=w for (v=w), we can obtain
the following relations:
dtneT jv=w
d(v=w)
= (  1)
 v
w
 2 fd
2fB
< 0;
dteT jv=w
d(v=w)
=
(  1)   v
w
 2
fd + (  1)
 
v
w
 2
fx
2fB
< 0;
dlne;sT jv=w
d(v=w)
= (  1)
 v
w
 2
fdR1 < 0;
dle;st;T jv=w
d(v=w)
= (  1)
 v
w
 2
fdR1 + (  1)
 v
w
 2
fxQ1 < 0;
dlne;uT jv=w
d(v=w)
= 
 v
w
 2
fdR2 > 0;
dle;ut;T jv=w
d(v=w)
= 
 v
w
 2
fdR2 + 
 v
w
 2
fxQ2 > 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Property 2.
In Lemma (2), we analyzed d(Gx=Gd)=d . In the following analysis, we can make analysis
easier and clearer by using d(Gx=Gd)=d .
yet;T jv=w can be rewritten as follows:
yet;T jv=w =
w
v
(Gd +Gx)
2
2fB2
=

1 +
Gx
Gd

ynet;T :
Hence, we can obtain
d(yet;T jv=w=y
ne
t;T jv=w)
d
=
d(yet;T jv=w=y
ne
t;T jv=w)
d(Gx=Gd)| {z }
+
d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
< 0:
 
p
w
e
d;T jv=w can be rewritten as follows:
 p
w
e
d;T jv=w
=
v
w
B(B + 1)f
Gd +Gx
=
 p
w
ne
T jv=w
1
1 +Gx=Gd
:
23
Hence, we can obtain
d
h 
p
w
e
d;T jv=w =
 
p
w
ne
T jv=w
i
d
=
d
h 
p
w
e
d;T jv=w =
 
p
w
ne
T jv=w
i
d(Gx=Gd)| {z }
 
d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
> 0:
teT jv=w can be rewritten as follows:
teT jv=w =
w
v
Gd +Gx
2fB
=

1 +
Gx
Gd

tneT jv=w:
Hence, we can obtain
d(teT jv=w=t
ne
T jv=w)
d
=
d(teT jv=w=t
ne
T jv=w)
d(Gx=Gd)| {z }
+
d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
< 0:
le;s
t;Ajv=w
lne;s
t;Ajv=w
can be rewritten as follows:
le;st;Ajv=w
lne;st;Ajv=w
= 1 +
Gx
Gd
Q1
R1
:
Hence, we can obtain
d(le;st;Ajv=w=l
ne;s
t;Ajv=w)
d
=
d(le;st;Ajv=w=l
ne;s
t;Ajv=w)
d(Gx=Gd| {z }
+
d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
< 0:
le;u
t;Ajv=w
lne;u
t;Ajv=w
can be rewritten as follows:
le;ut;Ajv=w
lne;ut;Ajv=w
= 1 +
Gx
Gd
Q2
R2
:
Hence, we can obtain
d(le;ut;Ajv=w=l
ne;u
t;Ajv=w)
d
=
d(le;ut;Ajv=w=l
ne;u
t;Ajv=w)
d(Gx=Gd| {z }
+
d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
< 0:
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Proof of Property 3.
In the following analysis, we can make analysis easier and clearer by using d(Gx=Gd)=d
as proof of property 2.
le;s
t;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;s
t;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
can be rewritten as follows:
le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;st;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
=
1 + Gx
Gd
Q1
R1
1 + Gx
Gd
Q2
R2
:
Hence, we can obtain
d
 
le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;st;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
!
=d(Gx=Gd) =
Q1
R1
  Q2
R2
1 + Gx
Gd
Q2
R2
2 :
We should note
Q1
R1
  Q2
R2
> 0 $ Q1
Q2
>
R1
R2
:
Hence, under a case of  > , we can obtain
d
 
le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;st;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
!
=d = d
 
le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;st;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
!
=d

Gx
Gd

| {z }
+
 d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
< 0;
and under a case of  < , we can obtain
d
 
le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;st;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
!
=d = d
 
le;st;T jv;w=l
e;u
t;T jv;w
lne;st;T jv;w=l
ne;u
t;T jv;w
!
=d

Gx
Gd

| {z }
 
 d(Gx=Gd)
d| {z }
 
> 0:
Proof of Property 4.
zTMT can be rewritten as follows:
zTMT =
R1L KR2 vw
Gx(Q2R1  Q1R2) :
We consider a case of  > .
d(zTMT )
d(v=w)
=
1
Q2R1  Q1R2| {z }
+
 KR2Gx   (
+z }| {
R1L KR2 v
w
)fx(
v
w
) 1
G2x| {z }
 
< 0:
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Then, we can obtain
d(zTMT )
d
=
d(zTMT )
d(v=w)| {z }
 
d(v=w)
d| {z }
+
< 0:
We consider a case of  > .
d(zTMT )
d(v=w)
=
1
(Q2R1  Q1R2)| {z }
 
 KR2Gx(1  ) R1Lfx( vw ) 1
G2x| {z }
 
> 0:
Then, we can obtain
d(zTMT )
d
=
d(zTMT )
d(v=w)| {z }
+
d(v=w)
d| {z }
 
< 0:
We consider a case of  > . From
dMT
d(v=w)
=
1
Q2R1  Q1R2| {z }
 
KQ2Gd  
 z }| {
(KQ2
v
w
  LQ1)fd
 
v
w
 1
G2d| {z }
+
< 0;
we can obtain
dMT
d
=
dMT
d(v=w)| {z }
 
d(v=w)
d| {z }
 
> 0
We consider a case of  > . From
dMT
d(v=w)
=
1
Q2R1  Q1R2| {z }
+
KQ2Gd(1  ) + LQ1fd
 
v
w
 1
G2d| {z }
+
> 0;
we can obtain
dMT
d
=
dMT
d(v=w)| {z }
+
d(v=w)
d| {z }
+
> 0:
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